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The state of freedom of expression in New Zealand: An 




1: Introduction: the social context of expression in New Zealand 
 
In keeping with other liberal-democratic polities, New Zealand’s law has long paid 
official veneration at the alter of freedom of expression. The reasons for doing so 
hardly need spelt out1—if there is one article of faith in the liberal-democratic 
worldview, it is that the individual right to speak one’s own mind is “a good thing”. 
Not that New Zealand’s longstanding respect for expressive values reflects purely 
theoretical concerns. It also dovetails neatly with a set of national character traits. As 
Michael King concludes in his magisterial overview of New Zealand history: 
most New Zealanders, whatever their cultural backgrounds, are good-
hearted, practical, commonsensical and tolerant. Those qualities are 
part of the national cultural capital that has in the past saved the 
country from the worst excesses of chauvinism and racism seen in 
other parts of the world.2 
 
This is a claim that, I wager, gives most Kiwis who read it a sensation of quiet pride 
and is a description that most would be happy for the rest of the world to hold of us as 
a people. On the whole, New Zealanders exult in the belief that theirs is a reasonably 
                                               
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago. This article is a somewhat reworked 
version of a paper presented at the Legal Research Foundation Conference, “The New Zealand Legal 
Method Series: Rights and Freedoms in New Zealand — The Bill of Rights Act Comes of Age”, 
Auckland, 27-28 July, 2007. 
1 But for an overview of those reasons, see E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd ed, OUP, Oxford, 2005, 
at pp. 1-38; Law Commission, Report 96: Reforming the Law of Sedition, Law Commission, 
Wellington, March 2007, at pp. 26-50. 
2 M. King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, Viking, Auckland, 2004, at p. 520. 
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tolerant society, where the right to say what you think is part and parcel of a broader 
commitment to giving everyone “a fair go”. 
However, least it be thought that this article is no more than a celebratory 
paean to the noble and tolerant Kiwi character, it is worth remembering that as a 
nation we actually have a somewhat chequered history when responding to words and 
deeds that challenge the prevailing social norm. Maori who sought to oppose the 
process of colonisation at Parihaka and elsewhere were met with force, up to and 
including military action.3 Archibald Baxter and his fellow conscientious objectors 
paid a notoriously high price for their principles during the First World War,4 with 
over 800 placed in detention camps during the Second World War for refusing to 
fight.5 During the 1951 Waterfront dispute, emergency regulations imposed rigid 
censorship, gave police sweeping powers and made it an offence for citizens to assist 
the workers involved; even giving food to their children was outlawed.6 Protesters 
against the Vietnam War received criminal convictions for actions such as chaining 
themselves to the front pillars of Parliament7 and attempting to lay an anti-war wreath 
during an ANZAC Day ceremony.8 The 1981 Springbok Tour produced brutal police 
action against peaceful protestors, albeit in the context of widespread civil unrest.9 
Furthermore, as the Law Commission recently noted, the offence of sedition was used 
                                               
3 For the history of Parihaka, see D. Scott, Ask That Mountain: The Story of Parihaka, Reed 
Publishing, Auckland, 2001; H. Riseborough Days of Darkness: Taranaki 1878-1884, Penguin Books, 
Auckland, 2002. 
4 See A. Baxter, We Will Not Cease, Cape Cately Ltd, Auckland, 1994. 
5 See N Taylor, The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War: The Home Front Vol. 
1, Historical Publications Branch, Wellington, 1986, at ch. 7. 
6 Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations 1951 (SR 1951/24). 
7 Melser v Police [1967] NZLR 437 (CA). 
8 Wainright v Police [1968] NZLR 101 (HC). 
9 See generally http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/culture/1981-springbok-tour. 
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sporadically to “attempt to control debate and expressions of political ideas and their 
consequences, by law.”10 
This admittedly selective history is not intended to make the claim that contra 
the previous picture of New Zealanders’ as generally tolerant and broad-minded, 
really we are a community of crypto-fascists, unable to stomach any form of dissent 
or difference. Viewed in a comparative light, and accepting that every society will fall 
short of perfection, the country’s record on civil liberties is better than most.11 
However, such events serve to remind us that New Zealand’s origins as a 
geographically isolated, settler society inevitably placed something of a premium 
upon conformity and predictability in its citizens’ behaviour. It is thus little surprise 
that a small island country uncertain of its national identity—where survival, let alone 
growth and development, depended upon a high degree of social cooperation—would 
restrict the individual’s ability to challenge settled social practice. Consequently, 
forms of expressive behaviour frequently have been treated as an undesirable 
impediment to a properly functioning community, with measures taken to suppress or 
punish it. Simply put, a conservative impatience with “silly buggers” or 
“troublemakers” who are perceived to be “spoiling things for the rest of us” has been 
as much a part of the national psyche as a commitment to giving everyone “a fair go”.  
However, as times change, social conditions also alter. The wave of neo-
liberal restructuring from 1984 onwards transformed a previously Statist, highly 
regulated economy. More easily accessed forms of travel and communication exposed 
New Zealanders to greater and more varied international influences, while the rise of 
a globalised information age increased the perceived value of transmitting ideas and 
knowledge. The tide of the international rights revolution, along with the rise of 
                                               
10 Law Commission, Report 96: Reforming the Law of Sedition, Law Commission, Wellington, March 
2007, at p. 25. 
11 See, e.g., Human Rights Commission, New Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights 2005-2010, 
Human Rights Commission, Wellington, 2005. 
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identity politics in place of more traditional, class-based political ideologies, 
reoriented ideas about the appropriate role of the State as regulator of personal 
conduct. In turn, these developments spawned a myriad of changes in New Zealand’s 
basic constitutional ordering. In 1993, a Mixed-Member Proportional voting system 
to elect members of Parliament was adopted. The rights of Maori as the indigenous 
inhabitants of New Zealand, recognised by the Treaty of Waitangi, have been 
accorded greater legal weight since the late 1980s.12 Homosexuality was 
decriminalised,13 access to official information has been opened up14 and a Human 
Right Commission has been established as an independent monitor of human rights 
issues.15 And perhaps most notable in the present context, the enactment of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) gave statutory affirmation to a range of 
individual rights, including the s.14 guarantee: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form.” 
I am, of course, skipping lightly over a large span of history here and 
traversing a wide range of issues in a quite summary manner. However, this article is 
not meant to be an exercise in socio-legal history. The abbreviated discussion above 
instead is intended to illustrate a more general point: because expression is a social 
practice, requiring both a speaker and an audience, the boundaries of what a given 
society will and will not allow to be expressed can be expected to shift as that society 
changes. Therefore, a general, high-level commitment to the abstract principle of 
freedom of expression can remain constant over time, even as the actual regulation 
applied to particular expressive activities varies. We must thus recognise that New 
                                               
12 Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188 (HC); New Zealand 
Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA). 
13 Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986. 
14 Official Information Act 1982. 
15 Human Rights Act 1993. 
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Zealand’s law incorporated free speech values prior to the enactment of the 
NZBORA, while that legislation’s affirmation of the right to freedom of expression 
was itself the product of a shifting cultural zeitgeist. Consequently, it is too simplistic 
to say that the NZBORA’s passage has in and of itself increased the perceived value 
of freedom of expression under New Zealand law. It undoubtedly has altered the 
particular way in which free speech values are manifested in legal and administrative 
decision-making processes. The s.14 guarantee has led to a new approach to 
discussing expressive values and the appropriate limits placed on these; a lexicon full 
of references to “legitimate purpose”, “rational connection”, “minimal impairment”, 
“proportionality”, and the like. However, answering the fundamental question—
when, and to what extent, should New Zealand law intervene to prevent a person 
engaging in some given expressive activity—ultimately still depends upon a balanced 
assessment of societal values that on many occasions lie outside of the NZBORA.16 
And the balance struck between these societal values can be expected to shift over 
time, as the background conditions and arrangement of New Zealand society itself 
alter.  
While this article is presented as a survey of freedom of expression issues in 
New Zealand, adequately covering all the ways such issues are relevant to the 
nation’s legal order would require a book length treatment. Therefore, the following 
discussion inevitably will have a somewhat eclectic and haphazard feel. It begins by 
recapping briefly some post-NZBORA developments in the common law of 
defamation and privacy. It then turns to look at the role the NZBORA has played in 
the realm of censorship. It concludes with a look at four very recent developments in 
                                               
16 This point, of course, is inherent in the structure of the NZBORA itself. Section 5 states that “…the 
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” This “justified 
limits” section has received extensive discussion by the Supreme Court in Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 
1 (SC). 
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the core expressive context of political speech: the abolition of sedition offences; 
expanding the scope for protest activity; restraining third party election expenses; and 
regulating the broadcast coverage of Parliament. I am conscious that this somewhat 
peripatetic approach means a number of important areas are not discussed. There is a 
particular gap regarding the role of the right to freedom of expression in relation to 
suppression orders and contempt proceedings.17 All that can be pleaded in defence of 
this lacunae is the sheer size of the topic, and the difficulty involved in trying to say 
anything meaningful about it in a necessarily limited number of words. 
 
2: Developments in the common law of defamation and privacy 
 
A question that took some time to attract the full attention of New Zealand’s judiciary 
was what “horizontal effect” the NZBORA should have on New Zealand’s legal 
system.18 This term refers to how the substantive rights recognised in a human rights 
instrument such as the NZBORA impact upon the legal rights and obligations that 
exist between private individuals, as opposed to “vertical” relations between citizens 
and the State. Although there can be little doubt that the NZBORA was intended to 
exert some horizontal effect upon New Zealand’s private law,19 the exact nature and 
extent of that effect was not clear. And while some commentators did raise the issue 
in New Zealand,20 it received nothing like (for instance) the sustained attention paid 
in the United Kingdom at the time of the introduction of its Human Rights Act 1998. 
                                               
17 However, these topics recently have been reviewed thoroughly in S. Mount, “The Interface Between 
the Media and the Law”, [2006] N.Z.L.Rev. 413. 
18 See generally P. Rishworth, “New Zealand: Taking Human Rights into the Private Sphere”, in D, 
Oliver and J. Fedtke (eds), Human Rights and the Private Sphere : A Comparative Study, Routledge-
Cavendish, London, 2007, at pp. 312-350. 
19 White Paper, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1985) AJHR A6, at para. [10.18]. 
20 See especially A Butler, “The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Private Common Law Litigation” 
[1991] NZLJ 261; P Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights, OUP, Melbourne, 2003, at 
pp.100-101. 
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Perhaps it is understandable, therefore, why it took nearly a decade for the courts to 
consider in detail what consequence the NZBORA’s affirmation of a right to freedom 
of expression should have for the existing common law. This right has particular 
relevance in regards two areas: the existing corpus of rules relating to defamation; and 
the emerging jurisprudence regarding the protection of individual privacy. These two 
areas of law are discussed in turn. 
 
(i): Developments in the law of defamation. 
 
The most obvious post-NZBORA development in the field of defamation is the 
creation in Lange v Atkinson of the defence of qualified privilege “in respect of 
generally-published statements which directly concern the functioning of 
representative and responsible government…”.21 Rosemary Tobin has summarised the 
effect of this development as follows: 
Provided they are made on a qualifying occasion — that is, where there is 
reciprocity of duty and interest in the maker of the statement and those 
who receive it — false statements of fact about the politician … can be 
widely disseminated, subject only to the statutory malice provision of the 
Defamation Act 1992: s 19.22 
 
Much has already been written about Lange v Atkinson,23 so I will not belabour the 
point here. However, it is interesting to note the rather limited role that the s.14 
affirmation of the right to freedom of expression played in the announcement of this 
new defence. Although Elias J, then sitting in the High Court, believed it to be a 
                                               
21 Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 at pp.467-8 (CA). See also Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 
385 (CA). 
22 R Tobin, “Political Discussion in New Zealand: Cause for Concern?” [2003] N.Z.L.Rev. 215, at p. 
216.  
23 P Rishworth et al, The New Zealand Bill of Rights, OUP, Melbourne, 2003, at pp. 317-321; J 
Burrows and U Cheer, Media Law in New Zealand, 5th ed, OUP, Melbourne, 2005, at ch. 3; S Todd 
(ed), The Law of Torts in New Zealand, 4th ed, Brookers, Wellington,  2005, paras [7.7]-[7.12]; A 
Butler and P Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2005, at paras. [13.17.7]-[13.17.21].  
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necessary step on the grounds that “the NZBORA protections are to be given effect 
by the Court in applying the common law”,24 the Court of Appeal preferred to base its 
ruling on a more general “right of New Zealanders to participate in the process of 
policy and decision making and to call the government to account”.25 A general right 
to freedom of expression clearly is a central component of “calling the government to 
account”, but the Court of Appeal’s failure to expressly invoke the NZBORA’s 
statutory affirmation of this right is still revealing. It indicates, I suggest, that the 
Court likely would have recognised the existence of the defence even if s.14 of the 
NZBORA had not been enacted—much as the U.K.’s House of Lords went about 
reshaping the law of defamation prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ right to freedom of expression.26 
There is then the question of whether this qualified privilege defence for 
commentary about politicians provides sufficient protection against the potential 
“chilling” effect of defamation actions. Grant Huscroft thinks not, opining that 
because the defence applies only in a limited range of situations which it falls to the 
courts to determine, “Lange is unlikely to be an adequate response to the problems 
caused by the law of defamation.”27 John Burrows similarly thinks that there likely 
will be pressure to expand the scope of the defence: “It could even be that in the 
fullness of time the Lange privilege may come to apply to all who might be described 
as ‘public figures’.”28 However, the basic premise of this reasoning—that wider legal 
protection for false expression is required least the fear of defamation action “chill” 
                                               
24 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 at p. 32 (HC). 
25 [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA) at p. 464, per Tipping J. However, Tipping J did go on to note that 
“striking a balance between freedom of expression and individual reputation is not easy. The striking of 
that balance must be informed by section 5 of the [NZBORA].” Ibid. at p.474. 
26 See Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others [1993] AC 534 (HL); Reynolds 
v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 3 WLR 1010 (HL). 
27 G Huscroft, “Freedom of Expression”, in P Rishworth et al, n.23 above, at p. 320. 
28 J Burrows, “Defamation”, in S Todd (ed), n.23 above, at p. 713. 
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otherwise desirable forms of expression—may be questioned. Ursula Cheer’s recent 
conclusions after surveying the actual impact of defamation law on the activities of 
news organizations are instructive: “the New Zealand media is aware of potentially 
chilling effects arising from the possibility of defamation claims, but that they 
generally think they can manage such risks and, on the whole, do so while making 
sure that the important stories see the light of day.”29  
Furthermore, for some defendants the prospect of a defamation action may not 
carry any chill effect at all. Indeed, some individuals or groups may positively 
embrace such a move as an opportunity to attract further publicity to its cause. The 
example of the “Save Happy Valley” coalition provides a concrete example of this 
phenomenon. This group is mounting an energetic campaign to prevent the S.O.E. 
Solid Energy from mining coal in the Happy Valley region of the South Island’s West 
Coast. In the course of this campaign, it published a parody copy of the company’s 
annual environmental report detailing (the group alleges) the true environmental 
consequences of the mining activities. Solid Energy then brought a defamation action 
in the High Court seeking to have this parody removed from the group’s website—a 
move that led it to welcome the “opportunity to debate the environmental record of 
the State-owned climate changer.”30 While the litigation was settled by the group’s 
agreement to remove Solid Energy’s logo from the document in question, the press 
coverage generated by the case meant the allegations contained in the document 
received far more public attention than they otherwise would have. It is likely that the 
                                               
29 U. Cheer, “Defamation in New Zealand and its Effects on the Media—Self-Censorship of 
Occupational Hazard?” [2006] N.Z.L.Rev 467, at p. 534. See also U. Cheer, “Myths and Realities 
About the Chilling Effect: The New Zealand Media’s Experience of Defamation Law” (2005) 13 Torts 
L.J. 259. 
30 See http://www.savehappyvalley.org.nz/node/290. 
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Save Happy Valley campaigners have drawn a lesson from the “McLibel” case in the 
UK;31 whether Solid Energy has done so is open to debate. 
 
(ii): Developments in the law of privacy. 
 
In contrast to the rather subsidiary role played by the NZBORA, s.14 in the field of 
defamation, the creation of a tort of invasion of privacy involved a much more direct 
and extended judicial consideration of its consequences for the development of the 
common law. The existence of this tort finally was confirmed in Hosking v Runting,32 
where a television personality sought to enjoin a magazine from printing pictures of 
his children taken on a public street while they were shopping. Although the claim 
failed on its facts, the Court of Appeal, in a 3-2 decision, accepted that invasion of 
privacy should be a recognised cause of action under New Zealand law. The majority 
concluded that while the tort would restrict the future publication of true facts, the 
limit this imposes on freedom of expression could be justified under s.5 of the 
NZBORA. Simply put, protecting the values of privacy—the majority did not go so 
far as to describe this as a “right”—provided a valid reason for restraining another’s 
right to publish factual material.33 Conversely, the minority did not believe the new 
                                               
31 See McDonald's Restaurants v Morris & Steel [1997] EWHC QB 336; Steel & Morris v McDonald’s 
Restaurants [1999] EWCA Civ 1144. For an account of this litigation, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McLibel_case.  
32 [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). See also Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (HC); 
Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415 (HC); P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC). For a 
discussion of the Court of Appeal’s ruling, see A Geddis, “Hosking v Runting: A privacy tort for New 
Zealand” (2005) 13 Tort L.Rev. 5. 
33 Actually, the Court of Appeal stated that “usually an injunction to restrain publication in the face of 
an alleged interference with privacy will only be available where there is compelling evidence of most 
highly offensive intended publicising of private information and there is little legitimate public concern 
in the information. In most cases, damages will be considered an adequate remedy.” Hosking v 
Runting, above n.32, at para.[158] per Gault P and Blanchard J. See also J Wilson, “Prior Restraint of 
the Press” [2006] N.Z.L.Rev. 551. However, insofar as the fear of incurring such pecuniary liability 
may “chill” speech, the tort still imposes a potential limit on freedom of expression. 
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tort should be recognised, for the primary reason that it could not be demonstrated 
that it was “necessary” under s.5 to limit freedom of expression in this fashion. 
I would make three points here.34 First of all, all five members of the bench 
accepted that the NZBORA had a role to play in deciding what the private law should 
be on this matter. Although they did not spell out why exactly it should be so, they 
accepted (or assumed) that the NZBORA ought to have some measure of horizontal 
application. Second, the bench could not agree on precisely what role the NZBORA 
should play in their decision. The heart of this division lay in how much weight a 
court should give to the fact that Parliament has affirmed freedom of expression 
affirmed as being a “right”. The majority thought this right should only have an 
indirect application to the development of the common law, as one social value to be 
considered amongst others. The minority chose to give the right a more direct 
application, according it a degree of protection that can only be overridden in the most 
pressing of circumstances. Finally, the majority decision to create the new tort rested 
upon a range of factors beyond the NZBORA itself: the increased threat posed to 
privacy interests by the modern media; the range of steps already taken by the 
legislature to protect privacy; the experience of other nations (in particular, the UK) in 
protecting privacy; an assessment of the appropriate role of the judiciary in refining 
the common law to deal with emerging social conflicts.  
Quite where this tort is headed is a matter for speculation. John Burrows has 
noted in a recent review of developments: “If given too free a rein, privacy could 
spread into areas where it does not belong, with the consequent threat to freedom of 
expression.”35 This warning is apt, if somewhat tautological. However, recent cases 
do not appear to indicate any real judicial opening of the  floodgates. The Hoskings’ 
                                               
34 These draw heavily on A Geddis. “The Horizontal Effects of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as 
Applied in Hosking v Runting” [2004] N.Z.L.Rev. 681. 
35 J. Burrows, “Invasion of Privacy — Hosking and Beyond” [2006] N.Z.L.Rev. 389, at p. 391. See also 
J. Burrows, “Media Law” [2006] N.Z.L.Rev. 769, at pp. 769-774. 
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substantive claim failed. The High Court in Andrews v TVNZ held that broadcasting 
the conversation of a couple involved in a car accident could not be shown to be 
“highly offensive” to a reasonable person in the defendants’ shoes,36 while the 
broadcaster also could claim the defence of “legitimate public concern”.37 The Court 
of Appeal in TVNZ v Rogers refused to grant an injunction to prevent the broadcast of 
a videotaped police interview with a person later acquitted of murdering a woman.38 
Even though a majority accepted there was a legitimate privacy issue involved, the 
court unanimously agreed that TVNZ could invoke the defence of legitimate public 
concern. This latter case remains before the Supreme Court at the time of writing, 
which may yet take a different view of the issues. But the evidence to date is that 
while the new invasion of privacy tort raises valid theoretical concerns in respect of 
freedom of expression, it has not had any really significant practical impact. 
 
Developments in the field of censorship 
 
New Zealand law allows for quite extensive censorship of forms of expression that 
are deemed to be “objectionable”, or to breach standards of “good taste and decency”. 
The former test applies to all “publications” that fall under the Films, Videos and 
Publications Classification Act 1993, while the latter is a part of the duties imposed 
on all broadcasters under the Broadcasting Act 1989, s.4.39 The Office of Film and 
Literature Classification is charged with determining if a publication is 
“objectionable”, subject to an appeal to The Film and Literature Board of Review. A 
                                               
36 Unreported, High Court Auckland, CIV 2004-404-3536 28 March 2007, at paras. [67]-[72]. 
37 Ibid. at paras. [91]-[94]. 
38 [2007] 1 NZLR 156. 
39 These two censorship regimes by-and-large operate separately; see In re Baise-Moi v Society for the 
Promotion of Community Standards [2005] NZAR 214. However, a film that has been classified as 
“objectionable” by the Office of Film and Literature Classification may only be broadcast with the 
permission of the Chief Censor; Broadcasting Act 1989, s.4(2). 
 13 
range of criminal offences, some of them strict liability, then apply to making, 
distributing or possessing material that is deemed “objectionable”.40 The broadcasting 
standards contained in the Broadcasting Act 1989 primarily are interpreted and 
applied by the Broadcasting Standards Authority, through a series of broadcasting 
codes of practice created in consultation with the broadcasters. Obviously, the role of 
each of these bodies bring them into direct conflict with the right to freedom of 
expression, as their entire raison d’être is to impose restrictions on expression in the 
name of some greater “public interest”. Some of the more notable developments with 
regard each body are considered in turn. 
 
(i): Censorship of publications. 
 
The interplay between the NZBORA’s affirmation of freedom of expression and the 
Films, Videos and Publications Act 1993 has attracted extended discussion by the 
Court of Appeal in the course of two separate decisions in Moonen v. Film and 
Literature Board of Review.41 Delivering the Court’s judgment, Tipping J rejected the 
notion that the censorship regime laid down by the Films, Videos and Publications 
Act 1993 forms a self-contained code that trumps any freedom of expression issues.42 
Any classification—or, to call it by its true name, “censorship”—decision instead 
must take into account as far as possible the right to freedom of expression. Simply 
put, the baseline presumption should be that the expression in the publication is 
permitted, unless and until the precise statutory reasons for deeming it to be 
“objectionable” are fully met. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has limited the scope 
of the statutory criteria to be applied when censoring a publication. In Living Word 
                                               
40 Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993, ss.122-132. 
41 [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA); [2002] 2 NZLR 754 (CA). 
42 Compare with News Media Ltd v Film and Literature Board of Review (1997) 4 HRNZ 410 (HC). 
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Distributors Ltd v Human Rights Action Group (Wellington),43 it ruled that the 
censorship regime only applies to publications dealing overtly with “matters such as 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence”;44 meaning that videos portraying 
homosexuality in a denigrating and demeaning light (but which did not depict any 
sexual activity) fell completely outside the Office of Film and Literature 
Classification’s purview. Consequently, the Films, Videos and Publications Act 1993 
does not serve as a general censorship regime for all forms of “harmful” or 
“undesirable” expression; it only encompasses those publications that meet the 
judicially narrowed “subject gateway” test laid out in the legislation. This aspect of 
the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the legislation in Living Word attracted some 
passing parliamentary ire, on the ground that “the Act no longer appears able to 
provide a contemporary focus on the types of  representations of most concern to the 
public.”45 However, proposals to amend the legislation and override the Court’s 
reading have fallen by the wayside, primarily due to public hostility to greater 
censorship powers. Similarly, the stigma of appearing “politically correct” led the 
Government Administration Committee in 2005 to abandon an inquiry into whether 
the “racial hate speech” provisions contained in the Human Rights Act 1993, ss. 61, 
131 should be widened to cover forms of expression that denigrates homosexuals, 
religious believers, and other minority groupings. 
That said, it is a matter for the expert determination of the Office of Film and 
Literature Classification whether a given publication within the ambit of the Films, 
Videos and Publications Act 1993 is “objectionable”.46 This fact makes it difficult to 
challenge the Office’s (or the Board of Review’s) decision—not only for an 
                                               
43 [2000] 3 NZLR 570 (CA). 
44 Films, Videos and Publications Act 1993, s.3(1). 
45 Government Administration Committee, Inquiry into the Operation of the Films, Videos, and 
Publications Classification Act 1993 and related issues, AJHR I.5A, March 2003, at p. 16. 
46 Society for the Promotion of Community Standards Inc v Film and Literature Board of Review 
(“Visitor Q”) [2005] 3 NZLR 403 (CA).  
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individual whose expression has been censored, but also those who believe that some 
particular expression should have been censored. Consequently, efforts to either allow 
or prevent the availability of a publication in New Zealand must rely on challenging 
procedural steps taken by the Office and Board of Review. A series of cases involving 
films brought to New Zealand for screening at film festivals highlights this point.47 A 
morals watchdog group, the Society for the Promotion of Community Standards, 
repeatedly appealed to the Board of Review the Office’s decision not to classify 
certain films as “objectionable”; then brought court proceedings seeking an interim 
restriction order to prevent the films from being screened until this appeal was 
resolved. Because the films already were scheduled to be shown as a part of an 
organised festival and would have no realistic market outside of such festivals, such 
an interim order threatens to prevent their screening altogether. Nevertheless, the 
Courts have emphasised that the role of interim restriction orders in preserving the 
status quo means that protecting freedom of expression should not be the overriding 
factor when deciding if issuing such an order is “in the public interest”.48  If nothing 
else, this stance has forced festival organisers to begin the classification process at an 
earlier date, so as to allow for any delays that may be involved as this procedure runs 
its course. These challenges to the right to screen (allegedly) “objectionable” films 
also serve as a reminder that conflicts over free speech are a zero-sum game: for every 
person wishing to expand the boundaries of what may be said or shown, there will be 
some who decry the perceived damage done to values such as “decency”, “morality”, 
and “community standards”. 
 
                                               
47 Re Baise Moi [2002] NZAR 884 (HC); Re Baise Moi [2002] NZAR 897 (HC); Re Baise Moi [2003] 
NZAR 200 (HC); Society for the Promotion of Community Standards Inc v Elliott  Unreported, High 
Court, Wellington, CIV-03-485-1117, 16 June 2003; Society for the Promotion of Community 
Standards Inc v Elliott, Unreported, High Court, Wellington, CIV-2004-485-1741, 27 August 2004.  
48 Re Baise Moi [2002] NZAR 884 (HC); Society for the Promotion of Community Standards Inc v 
Elliott, Unreported, High Court, Wellington, CIV-2004-485-1741, 27 August 2004. 
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(ii): Censorship of broadcasting. 
 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) has developed an extensive body of 
decisions as to the meaning and application of the broadcasting standards contained in 
the Broadcasting Act 1989 and related codes of practice, the breadth of which defy 
any attempt at summary.49 Until recently, however, it was unclear just what role the 
NZBORA’s guarantee of freedom of expression should play with regard to these 
standards.50 Conflicting High Court decisions had held that only the codes of practice 
adopted to implement the required broadcasting standards need be NZBORA 
compliant,51 and that the actual decision reached by the BSA under the code of 
practice must be NZBORA compliant.52 While this may appear to be a distinction 
without much difference, in that on most occasions one would expect that applying a 
NZBORA compliant code will produce a NZBORA compliant outcome,53 it could 
have consequences in terms of how amenable the BSA’s decisions are to review by 
the courts.54 If it is just the code of practice that needs to comply with the NZBORA, 
then the BSA’s application of that code to a particular programme will be reviewable 
by the courts only on general reasonableness grounds.55 However, if each and every 
decision reached under the code of practice must be NZBORA compliant, then the 
courts would seem to have far broader grounds on which to review a ruling by the 
BSA that a programme is in breach of some aspect of the code.  
                                               
49 The BSA’s decisions are available at http://www.bsa.govt.nz/latestdecisions.php. 
50 The BSA has set out its understanding of its obligations under the NZBORA in Browne v Canwest 
TVWorks Ltd, Decision No. 2005-112, at paras. [88]-[98]. 
51 TV3 Network Services Ltd v Holt [2002] NZAR 1013 (HC). 
52 TVNZ v Viewers for Television Excellence Inc [2005] NZAR 1 (HC). 
53 A. Butler and P. Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary, LexisNexis Ltd, 
Wellington,  2005, at para. [13.19.14]. 
54 There is a statutory right of appeal from the BSA to the High Court, Broadcasting Act 1989, s.18. 
55 This is the position adopted by the House of Lords in R v British Broadcasting Corporation, ex p 
Prolife Alliance [2003] 2 All ER 977. For comment, see A Geddis, “’If Thy Right Eye Offend Thee, 
Pluck it Out’: R v BBC, ex p ProLife Alliance” (2003) 66 M.L.R. 885. 
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This issue again emerged in the course of litigation stemming from C4’s 
decision to screen the “Bloody Mary” episode of the cartoon South Park.56 The New 
Zealand Catholic Bishop’s Conference appealed the BSA’s decision that this 
programme—containing a depiction of a menstruating statue of the Virgin Mary—did 
not breach either the Good Taste and Decency or Denigration of Identifiable Groups 
standards contained in the relevant code of practice.57 In reaching this conclusion, the 
BSA considered that it was obliged to give full effect to the NZBORA, s.14 when 
reviewing the programme.58 Consequently;  
Were the Authority to uphold the complaint, this would amount to a 
statement that broadcasters who offer satire, humour and drama as their 
fare may not offend against the religious convictions of others, and that 
such offence amounts to a breach of good taste and decency. That, in the 
view of the Authority, would be an unreasonable limitation of a 
broadcaster’s right to freedom of expression, which includes the right to 
satirise religious issues.59 
 
On appeal in the High Court, Wild J rejected the Catholic Bishop’s contention that the 
BSA had erred in considering the NZBORA when applying the relevant broadcasting 
standards.60 Furthermore, he upheld the BSA’s overall finding that the programme did 
not breach these broadcast standards, emphasising that “there are [no] universal 
standards of good taste and decency, that can and must be upheld irrespective of the 
context of the matter in issue.”61 The particular expertise and experience of the BSA 
means it is to be accorded considerable latitude in assessing and applying these 
standards.62 Consequently, Wild J’s judgment both affirms the relevance of the 
                                               
56 Browne v CanWest TV Works Ltd, Unreported, HC Wellington, Wild J, CIV 2006 4851161, 31 July 
2007. 
57 Broadcasting Standards Authority, Code of Broadcasting Practice: Free to Air Television, August 
2006  (at http://www.bsa.govt.nz/pdfs/bsa-freetvcode.pdf). 
58 Simmons v CanWest TVWorks Ltd, Decision No. 2006-022, at paras. [63]-[74]. 
59 ibid., at para. [117]. 
60 n.56 above, at paras. [30]-[42]. Wild J thus restated a position he previously had taken in TVNZ v 
Viewers for Television Excellence Inc, n. 52 above. 
61 n.56 above, at para [73]. 
62 ibid., at paras. [40]; [50]; [52]. 
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NZBORA’s affirmation of freedom of expression to the BSA’s role in maintaining 
broadcasting standards, while at the same time largely insulating from review its 
assessment of how that right is to be applied in a particular case.63 It will be 
interesting, however, to see whether this judicial deference to the BSA’s overall 
competence carries over to a case where it has decided a programme is in breach of 
the relevant standards, irrespective of the broadcaster’s right to freedom of 
expression.64 Might such a finding, likely accompanied by the imposition of a penalty 
on the broadcaster, attract more of a “hard look” standard of review by the courts? 
 
Developments in the regulation of political expression 
 
It is commonplace to note that while the right to freedom of expression “is as wide as 
human thought and imagination”,65 it is of most pressing concern with respect to 
matters of public political controversy.66 Consequently, efforts to limit or prevent 
expression relating to Politics writ large should attract an increased level of scrutiny 
and face a greater justificatory burden. This article already has touched on one 
example of this phenomenon at work: the creation of the defence of qualified 
privilege with regard to comment about those who are, or are seeking to become, 
members of Parliament. However, there always will be countervailing interests even 
with regard expression about matters political. Speech that advocates governmental, 
social or cultural change still may be subject to limitations, provided the reasons for 
imposing those limits are sufficiently weighty. This final section considers four 
                                               
63 Wild J went so far as to say that a court will only overturn the BSA’s censorship decision if it can be 
shown that this is “plainly wrong”; ibid., at paras. [23]; [54]. 
64 See, e.g., Barnes v Alt TV Ltd, Decision No. 2007-029. 
65 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA), at para. [15], per Tipping J. 
66 The locus classici for this claim is A. Meiklejohn, Free speech and its relation to self-government, 
Harper, New York, 1948. 
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contemporary issues involving the regulation of political expression in New Zealand. 
In two of these examples—the abolition of New Zealand’s sedition laws and 
expanding the scope for protest activity—there have been moves to reduce or loosen 
potential limits on political expression. In the other two—restraining third party 
election spending and limiting the broadcast coverage of Parliament—there have been 
moves to impose or tighten such limits. The point is that even at the core of its 
application, the right to freedom of expression is still treated as a contingent one, 
subject to balancing against other competing interests and values. 
 
(i): Abolition of the sedition laws. 
 
In March of 2007, the Law Commission released its report on Reforming the Law of 
Sedition.67 This document examined the criminal offences contained in the Crimes 
Act 1961, ss. 81-85, which impose a penalty of up to two years of imprisonment on a 
range of expressive activities motivated by a “seditious intention”. The statutory 
definition of this term includes “excit[ing] disaffection against, Her Majesty, or the 
Government of New Zealand”, “incit[ing] the public … to attempt to procure 
otherwise than by lawful means the alteration of any matter affecting the Constitution, 
laws, or Government of New Zealand”, and “excit[ing] such hostility or ill will 
between different classes of persons as may endanger the public safety”.68 After 
reviewing the history of these offences, assessing them against the right to freedom of 
expression and examining how other jurisdictions deal with the issue, the Law 
Commission recommended their repeal. Four principal reasons were given for this 
conclusion:69 the breadth and vague nature of the offences; their impact on freedom of 
                                               
67 Law Commission, Reforming the Law of Sedition, Report 96, March 2007. 
68 Crimes Act 1961, s.81(1).  
69 n. 67 above, at p. 11, para. [14]; p.68, para. [242]. 
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expression (which could not be justified under the NZBORA); their potential use as 
an inappropriate form of political censorship; and the existence of a range of other 
provisions that specifically target many of the relevant harms that the sedition 
offences are intended to prevent.  
The Law Commission’s recommendation provoked a remarkably swift political 
response. Members of Parliament from four smaller parties—the Greens, Maori Party, 
United Future and Act—banded together to demand that the Government act on the 
advice. The Government then introduced legislation to do so. The Crimes (Repeal of 
Seditious Offences) Amendment Bill 2007 unanimously passed its first reading in the 
House and received an expedited hearing from the Justice and Electoral Committee, 
which then recommended unanimously that the Bill be enacted.70 Although the speed 
of this response may reflect a degree of MMP-era political posturing, as well as the 
fact that the present Government faces challenges progressing more contentious 
legislation through the House, it also demonstrates that the sedition offences generally 
were seen to be an antiquated and unnecessary relic of colonial law. During the first 
reading debate, for example, Labour’s Russell Fairbrother claimed they:71 
[hark] back to the days when society was ruled by the king or queen, and 
the hierarchy in society was understood by people at all levels of society. It 
is a very British and colonial approach to life, which, hopefully, we are 
moving away from.  
 
Another way to view this development is that the kind of social threats the sedition 
offences originally were designed to combat—incitement to revolutionary activity, 
advocacy of violent opposition to the Crown, or the fomenting of rebellion against 
established authority—no longer appear to pose any real, imminent danger in 
contemporary New Zealand. We appear to have developed sufficient confidence in 
the overall legitimacy of our governing institutions and practices that we safely can 
                                               
70 Justice and Electoral Committee, “Report on the Crimes (Repeal of Seditious Offences) Amendment 
Bill”, 120-1, 24 August 2007. 
71 Hansard, 19 June 2007, vol. 640, p. 9975. 
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assume attempts to bring about an uprising against them will produce nothing more 
than overwhelming audience disinterest. 
Supporting this analysis, recent moves by the Police to lay charges under the 
sedition offences highlight their relatively peripheral status. In 2006, a political 
protestor who put an axe through the Prime Minister’s electorate office window, then 
distributed pamphlets to the media urging “like-minded New Zealanders” to carry out 
similar acts, was convicted of publishing a seditious statement and sentenced to two 
months imprisonment.72 However, the fact he also was convicted of conspiracy to 
commit criminal damage for the act of smashing the window—and sentenced to a 
concurrent two-month term of imprisonment—made the sedition charge redundant. 
Similarly, police threats to charge a Dunedin pub owner with sedition for distributing 
a flier offering students the chance to win a petrol-soaked couch seemed to stretch the 
purpose of the offence to breaking point. If these are the sorts of expression being 
targeted by the sedition offences today, then they form little more than a cover-all 
charge for the actions of fools, rather than a bulwark against illegitimate attempts to 
bring about profound social change by violent or illegitimate means. 
 
(ii): Expanding the scope for protest activity. 
 
Historically, there has been no formal, stand-alone “right to protest” in New 
Zealand.73 Protest activities instead have taken place where the law remained silent: 
the default position is that which is not expressly prohibited, is allowed. The country’s 
general cultural commitment to liberal-democratic values then ensured a measure of 
                                               
72 A conviction and sentence upheld by the Court of Appeal; R v Selwyn [2007] NZCA 124 (4 April, 
2007). This decision is quite remarkable in that it upholds the conviction without mentioning the 
NZBORA at all. 
73 See K. Keith, “The Right to Protest”, in K. Keith (ed), Essays on Human Rights, Sweet & Maxwell, 
Wellington, 1968, at p. 49; R. Hart, “The Mobs Are Out: The Right to Protest on Public Roads” (2001) 
9 Auckland U.L.Rev. 311. 
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freedom to protest simply by making it too politically costly for parliamentarians to 
pass legislation preventing such activities. Furthermore, the courts on occasion have 
recognised the importance of permitting dissenting activities,74 indicating that 
criminal offences should be interpreted and applied in a way that does not unduly 
restrict the ability of individuals to protest.75 Finally, the NZBORA’s affirmation of 
the right to freedom of expression—along with the allied rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly (s.16), freedom of association (s.17) and freedom of movement 
(s.18)—now provides a statutory recognition of the importance of the kinds of 
activities traditionally associated with political protest. 
A number of recent developments also point to increased official sensitivity to 
the importance of allowing protest action to take place. In 2000, for example, 
Parliament’s Justice and Electoral Committee issued a report that strongly criticised 
the Police for intervening in protests against the visit of the President of China and 
recommended a range of procedural changes to prevent a repeat.76 The Police 
subsequently made a number of payments to individuals arrested during those 
protests, tacitly recognising that their expressive rights had been breached. The courts 
also have been somewhat more solicitous of protest rights than they were in the past. 
In 1998, the High Court found that the right to peaceful assembly affirmed in the 
NZBORA, s.16, imposes a “reasonableness” requirement on a public official who 
seeks to invoke the Trespass Act 1980 against persons engaged in protest activity.77 In 
2004, the High Court refused to convict a protestor who burnt the New Zealand flag 
at an anti-war demonstration after using the right to freedom of expression affirmed in 
                                               
74 See, e.g., Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society v Mount Roskill Borough [1959] NZLR 1236. 
75 See, e.g., Police v Christie [1962] NZLR 1109, at 1113; Melser v Police, n.7 above; Wainwright v 
Police, n.8 above, at 103. Of course, in all of these cases the judicial recognition of a right to engage in 
dissenting speech did not prevent convictions from being entered! 
76 Justice and Electoral Committee, “Inquiry into matters relating to the visit of the President of China 
to New Zealand in 1999”, AJHR I.7A (2000) 
77 Police v Beggs [1999] 3 NZLR 615 (HC). 
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the NZBORA to read down the offence of destroying this emblem “with the intention 
of dishonouring it.”78 Although one may question the particular way that France J 
applied the s.6 interpretation provision so as to give the relevant legislation a rights 
consistent meaning—it appears to rewrite the statutory wording in a way the Supreme 
Court subsequently has indicated is inappropriate79—the outcome demonstrates an 
increased judicial appreciation of the importance of allowing dissenting voices to 
express their views in a manner that may outrage the sensibilities of those witnessing 
the protest. 
This appreciation of the value of dissent is also central to the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Brooker v Police. 80 In the Court’s first judgment to deal directly 
with freedom of expression issues, the majority redefined the concept of disorderly 
behaviour so as to give greater protection to the rights of protestors. Before turning to 
consider the case in detail, some background is necessary. The offence of disorderly 
behaviour, contained in s.4(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1981,81 has long cast a 
shadow over protest activity. The offence allows for the arrest without warrant, with a 
fine upon conviction of up to $1000, of any person who “[i]n or within view of any 
public place, behaves in an offensive or disorderly manner”. It is not necessary that 
the behaviour threaten to provoke a breach of the peace or other violent response.82 In 
two seminal cases dealing with protests against the Vietnam War, the courts stated 
that the behaviour only need to have the potential to so annoy or insult “right thinking 
members of the public”83 as to justify the imposition of a criminal conviction.84 Given 
                                               
78 Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704 (HC). 
79 Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) at paras. [150]-[158] per Tipping J; [236]-[254] per McGrath J; 
[287]-[290] per Anderson J. 
80 [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC). 
81 Prior to 1981, a similar offence was contained in the Police Offences Act 1927, s.3D. 
82 Indeed, such behaviour today is covered by a separate offence in the Summary Offences Act 1981, 
s.3. 
83 Police v Christie, n.75 above, at p. 1113;  Melser v Police, n.7 above, at p. 443 per North P. 
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the fact that protest activity by its very nature is likely to provoke this response, the 
potential impact of this offence on dissenting voices is obvious. To give but one 
example, calling out “the Treaty was a fraud” in “a loud and commanding voice” 
during a Waitangi Day celebration held in the Beehive’s banquet hall resulted in an 
arrest and subsequent conviction for disorderly behaviour.85 Similarly, a protestor 
who repeatedly used the word “fuck” during a political protest in a public square was 
arrested and convicted on the interchangeable charge of offensive behaviour, because 
some who heard him speak may have been offended in a “more than trivial way”.86 
This judicial approach largely survived the introduction of the NZBORA in 
1990, with the courts continuing to rely on the legal tests developed before its 
enactment.87 The pre-NZBORA authorities were said to already recognise the need to 
balance an individual’s right to free expression with other social values (even if 
different language would be used for that balancing test today).88 Dissenting 
behaviour which fails the balancing test by generating an unacceptable level of 
annoyance or insult legitimately could be punished, as such a limit on expression is 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” as per the NZBORA, s.5.89 
Therefore, in 1996 the Court of Appeal upheld a naturist’s conviction for disorderly 
behaviour after he walked nude in the street outside his home, as his “conduct was 
such as would arouse feelings of anger, disgust or outrage in the average reasonable 
                                                                                                                                      
84 Melser v Police, n.7 above, at pp. 443 per North P, 444 per Turner J, 446 per McCarthy J; 
Wainwright v Police, above n.8, at p. 103. 
85 Caithness v Police (1986) 2 CRNZ 201 (HC). 
86 Jeffrey v Police [1994] 11 CRNZ 507 (HC), at p. 515 per Tipping J. On the relationship between 
“offensive” and “disorderly” behaviour, see R v Ceramalus, CA 14/96, 17 July 1996, at pp. 4-5 per 
Thomas J. 
87 See Ceramalus v Police (1991) 7 CRNZ 678 (HC); Jeffrey v Police [1994] 11 CRNZ 507 (HC); 
Police v Geiringer [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 331 (HC); Garnham v Police [1997] 3 NZLR 228 (HC); 
Police v Beggs [1999] 3 NZLR 615 (HC); Stemson v Police [2002] NZAR 278 (HC); Phillips v Police 
(2004) 20 CRNZ 1106 (HC); R v Rowe [2005] 2 NZLR 833 (CA). 
88 R v Ceramalus (CA 14/96, 17 July 1996), at pp. 10-11 per Thomas J. 
89 Jeffrey v Police, above n.86, at p. 513 per Tipping J; Phillips v Police, n.87 above at pp. 1109-1111 
per France J. 
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person.”90 The Court summarily rejected the naturist’s contention that this conviction 
unjustifiably breached his asserted NZBORA, s.15 right to express his “Christian 
beliefs”—any right to manifest his religious convictions automatically succumbed to 
the right of users of public spaces to be free from significant mental upset.  
Mr Brooker’s case provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to address 
the impact of the offence of disorderly behaviour on protest activities. It arose after 
Mr Brooker, irritated at being served with a search warrant late one Saturday night, 
took a guitar and protest sign to the home of the Constable who had served it on him. 
He knocked for some minutes on her door at 9:20 am, knowing she had just finished a 
shift of night duty and likely would be trying to sleep. When she told him to leave, he 
retreated to the roadside and commenced playing protest songs about her actions in 
what was described as “a normal singing voice”. This activity continued for some 15-
30 minutes, whereupon the Constable’s colleagues arrived. When Mr Brooker refused 
to leave, he was arrested. At his trial in the District Court, Mr Brooker was found 
guilty of disorderly behaviour, on the ground that his actions amounted to “behaving 
in a way that right thinking members of the public would consider inappropriately 
annoying to members of the public.”91 Particular weight was given to the fact that his 
protest had taken place outside the Constable’s private dwelling rather than at the 
police station or another “more appropriate” protest environment.92  
Mr Brooker’s conviction was upheld by the High Court93 and a unanimous 
Court of Appeal.94 However, the Supreme Court overturned his conviction by a 3-2 
                                               
90 R v Ceramalus, n.88 above, at p. 6 per Thomas J. 
91 Police v Brooker (District Court, Greymouth, 30 June 2003, Callaghan DCJ), at para [5]. Mr Brooker 
was then fined $300, plus $130 in court costs. 
92 ibid., at paras [31]-[32]. 
93 Brooker v Police Unreported, High Court, Greymouth, John Hansen J, CRI 2003-418-000004, 16 
October 2003. 
94 R v Brooker (2004) 22 CRNZ 162 (CA). 
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majority.95 The majority was concerned that the boundary of acceptable protest 
activity in New Zealand law must take appropriate account of the affirmed right to 
freedom of expression under s.14, which applied to Mr Brooker’s particular protest 
against the Constable’s actions. Consequently, Elias CJ and Blanchard J emphasised 
that forms of expressive behaviour that generated feelings of annoyance—even 
considerable annoyance—in those exposed to it should no longer be deemed 
“disorderly” on that ground alone.96 In order to give s.4(1)(a) a reading that 
adequately protects the right to freedom of expression under NZBORA, s.14, the 
behaviour instead must be “seriously disruptive of public order”,97 in the sense of 
“substantially disturb[ing] the normal functioning of life in the environs of that 
place”.98 Tipping J likewise thought the lower courts’ focus on the annoyance caused 
to the Constable was “problematic”.99 His preferred test for determining whether 
behaviour is disorderly instead was, “if, as a matter of time, place and circumstance, it 
causes anxiety or disturbance which is beyond what a reasonable citizen should be 
expected to bear.”100 While the minority also were at pains to recognise and affirm the 
importance of dissenting expression,101 they believed nevertheless that Mr Brooker’s 
particular actions had imposed an unreasonable burden on the Constable. She had a 
right to enjoy peace and tranquillity in her home that overrode Mr Brooker’s right to 
express his grievance directly to its source.102 Consequently, his conviction for the 
offence of disorderly behaviour represented a justified limit on his right to freedom of 
expression, as per s.5 of the NZBORA. 
                                               
95 [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC). 
96 ibid. at paras. [24], [33] per Elias CJ; [63] per Blanchard J. 
97 ibid. at para. [24] per Elias CJ 
98 ibid. at para. [56] per Blanchard J. 
99 ibid. at para. [84] per Tipping J. He then stated “I agree with what the Chief Justice has said in that 
regard.” 
100 ibid. at para. [90] per Tipping J. 
101 See ibid. at para. [116] per McGrath J. 
102 ibid. at para. [129] per McGrath J; para. [225] per Thomas J. 
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The division on the Supreme Court bench thus reflected differing judicial 
assessments of the weight to be attached to freedom of expression vis-à-vis privacy in 
the immediate case. For the majority, Mr Brooker’s right to expression required that 
the Constable must tolerate a relatively short, low-key form of protest designed to 
intrude unwelcome messages into her home. For the minority, the fact the expression 
had this intrusive effect justifies attaching a criminal penalty to it. However, 
Blanchard and Tipping JJ (along with McGrath J in the minority) took particular pains 
to point out the context-specific nature of their analysis and to stress that a different 
outcome may well be required for protest activity that occurs in even slightly different 
circumstances.103 While it is understandable why this rather fact-sensitive approach to 
the issues was taken, it does limit somewhat the overall value of the decision as a 
precedent; Thomas J’s observation that “at this appellate level, something more is 
required than a ‘rejigging’ of the balance” perhaps has some bite to it.104 At the least, 
the absence of any real “bright line” rules in the Court’s decision (indeed, the absence 
of any agreed test for what will amount to “disorderly conduct”) means that future 
cases, such as that involving the protestors who burned a New Zealand flag at this 
year’s ANZAC Day ceremonies in Wellington,105 will be needed to clarify exactly 
how far the balance has shifted in favour of expressive freedom over audience peace 
of mind. 
 
(iii): Restraining “third party” election spending. 
 
                                               
103 See ibid. at paras. [57], [64] per Blanchard J; para. [92] per Tipping J; paras. [140] [145], per 
McGrath J. 
104 ibid. at para. [154]. 
105 “Anzac Day protestors in court over flag burning”, NZ Herald, May 22, 2007 (at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10441104). 
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An unusually large amount of “third party” advertising activity took place during the 
2005 election campaign.106 Most notoriously, members of the Exclusive Brethren 
Church reportedly spent some $800,000-$1.5 million on leaflets that attacked the 
Labour and Green parties, while promoting policies closely connected with the 
National Party. (The widely varying estimates of the amount spent reflect the fact that 
there is no current requirement for third parties to disclose their election related 
expenditures.) Other groups, the unions and racing industry in particular, mounted 
their own advocacy campaigns with the aim of influencing voter preferences. 
Although there is some question as to whether all of this spending fell within the 
current rules governing election campaigning—some may have crossed the line and 
“appear[ed] to encourage or persuade voters to vote for a [political] party”,107 or have 
failed to include the “true name and address” of the person responsible for publishing 
it108—the great majority of it probably was lawful.  
This kind of third party election spending raises at least two concerns.109 Most 
obviously, basic notions of democratic equality may be compromised (or be seen to 
be compromised) if individuals or groups are able to use their wealth to try and 
influence the election campaign. The more wealth that an individual or group has, the 
more influence it may achieve (or be seen to achieve). There is also a related problem 
of political parties seeking to “farm out” their election advertising. Because New 
Zealand’s election rules put a cap on the political parties’ overall election expenses, 
                                               
106 See generally A. Geddis, Election Law in New Zealand: Practice and Policy, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2007, at pp. 147-151. 
107 The Election Act 1993, s. 221, makes it an “illegal practice” to publish any such advertising without 
first obtaining the written authorisation of the Secretary of the relevant party. Following the 2005 
election, the Chief Electoral Officer referred one of the Exclusive Brethren leaflets to the police as 
potentially breaching this section, but the police declined to prosecute the matter.  
108 The Election Act 1993, s. 221A, makes it an “illegal practice” to publish an advertisement “relating 
to an election” without including this information. Again, the Chief Electoral Officer referred several 
instances to the police following the 2005 election, but none were then prosecuted. 
109 See A Geddis, “Democratic Visions and Third-Party Independent Expenditures” (2001) 9 Tulane J. 
Int. and Comp. L. 5. 
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there may be a temptation to use nominally independent individuals or groups to carry 
out advertising above and beyond the level otherwise allowed by law. Such extra 
spending may then give (or be seen to give) that political party an unfair advantage 
over its electoral rivals. The metaphor usually adopted to summarise these concerns is 
that of “the level playing field”, whether this be for groups in civil society or political 
parties directly contesting the election.  
However, any move to limit the engagement of individuals or groups in the 
election campaign raises obvious freedom of expression concerns. Because money is 
so necessary to engage in effective, large-scale communication, capping the amount 
that third parties can spend on election related advertising (as well as imposing other 
regulatory controls such as registration or disclosure requirements) inevitably impacts 
upon their ability to communicate with the electorate at large. It may then be argued 
that preventing individuals or groups from engaging in election-related speech is 
wrong as a matter of principle.110 Communicating with voters at election time lies at 
the very heart of the right to freedom of expression, placing a very heavy justificatory 
burden on those who would restrain such messages. And it is debatable what 
immediate “harm” a limit on third party spending is designed to combat. There is only 
sketchy evidence that such spending can “buy” an election result—to use the concrete 
example of the Exclusive Brethren’s spending in 2005, it convincingly can be argued 
that the revelation of who was funding it, along with questions about the National 
Party’s knowledge of it, actually deprived National of victory at the polls. 
Furthermore, if the spending takes place independently of a party or candidate, 
concerns that it may lead to quid pro quo corruption are somewhat ameliorated. So if 
there is no definitive empirical evidence about the effect of spending on electoral 
                                               
110 See, e.g.,  R. Partridge and J. Wilson, “Electoral Finance Bill Undermines Freedoms Protected by 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990”, N.Z. Lawyer, 31 August 2007, p. 16. 
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competition, and no immediate link between such spending and the adoption of 
particular policies, how can it be justifiable for the State to limit such expression? 
One possible answer lies in recognising the existence of differing basic 
conceptions of the electoral process.111 In Harper v Canada (A.G.),112 the majority of 
the Canadian Supreme Court distinguished between a “libertarian” and “egalitarian” 
model of elections when rejecting a Charter challenge to the imposition of limits on 
third party election spending.113 The former places a high premium on the freedom of 
individuals and groups to participate at election time to whatever extent they wish, 
thereby imposing a high justificatory burden on those seeking to limit electoral 
communications. The latter emphasises the presumptive right of each member of 
society to have their interests equally recognised in the election process, with the 
potential or perceived impact of asymmetrically distributed economic resources on 
this right to equal recognition a valid matter for regulation. The Canadian Supreme 
Court then upheld the right of Parliament, as the directly elected representatives of the 
Canadian people, to make this basic value judgment about how the nation’s electoral 
process should be structured.114 In New Zealand, Parliament already has demonstrated 
a broad commitment to an egalitarian approach to election spending:115 limits apply to 
the campaign spending of political parties and candidates; tight restrictions exist on 
the use of the broadcast media for electoral purposes; sizeable donations to parties or 
                                               
111 See A. Geddis, “Representative democracy: what’s the law got to do with it?”, (2006) 12 Otago 
L.Rev. 197, at pp. 203-206. 
112 [2004] SCC 33. 
113 ibid. at para. [62], per Bastarache J. See also C. Feasby, “Libman v Quebec (A.G.) and the 
Administration of the Process of Democracy Under the  Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian Model” 
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Geddis, “Liberte, Egalite, Argent: Third Party Election Spending and the Charter” (2004) 42 Alberta 
L.Rev. 429. 
114 The European Court of Human Rights also has held that limits on third party spending are consistent 
in principle with the right to freedom of expression contained in Article 10 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See Bowman v United Kingdom 
(1998) 63 ECHR 175; A. Geddis. “Confronting the ‘Problem’ of Third Party Expenditures in United 
Kingdom Election Law” (2001) 27 Brooklyn J. of Int. L. 103. 
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candidates must be disclosed to public (albeit in an incomplete and patchy fashion). 
Simply put, New Zealand as a society does not appear to want its electoral processes 
to become dominated by the raising and spending of money, as has occurred in the 
United States (and, to a lesser degree, Australia). In this context, a decision to limit 
the spending of third party groups on electoral communications can be justified as a 
part of a wider scheme of regulation.  
Nevertheless, even if some form of restrictions on third party activity at 
election time can be justified in principle, free-speech concerns may still arise out of 
any particular regulatory proposal. Both the Canadian Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights have ruled that restrictions on third party spending 
that preclude “meaningful participation” at election time cannot be justified.116 The  
introduction of the Electoral Finance Bill into the House in July of 2007 posed just 
such problems. This Bill would regulate any third party wishing to publish an 
“election advertisement” during the “regulated period”. The definition of “election 
advertisement” was drawn very widely, including “any form of words or graphics, or 
both, that can reasonably be regarded as … taking a position on a proposition with 
which 1 or more parties or 1 or more candidates is associated.”117 The “regulated 
period” also was quite extensive, beginning on the 1st of January of any year in which 
Parliament is due to expire and ending on polling day.118 The Bill then proposed a 
range of restrictions on such expression. 
• No person may publish, or cause to be published, any election advertisement 
during the regulated period unless the “promoter” of the advertisement either 
is a registered third party, or provides a declaration (under the Oaths and 
                                               
116 Libman v Quebec (A.G.) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569; Harper, n.112 above; Bowman, n.114 above. 
117 Election Funding Bill 2007, cl. 5. 
118 ibid., cl. 4. In practice, given that elections usually are held in October or November, this period will 
last some 10-11 months. If a snap election is held in a year Parliament is not due to expire, the 
regulated period is a set 3 months from polling day. 
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Declarations Act 1957, s.9) that they will not spend more than $500 in an 
electorate or $5000 nationally on such advertising.119 
• Only registered electors, New Zealand body corporates, or unincorporated 
bodies entirely made up of members who are registered electors may register 
as third parties.120 
• Registered third parties would be required to disclose publicly the identity of 
all donors giving more than $500 and prohibited from receiving anonymous 
donations (or donations from a trust or like entity where the original donor 
cannot be identified) that exceed $500.121 
• Registered third parties are restricted to spending no more than $2000 in any 
electorate, or $60,000 nationally, on publishing election advertisements during 
the regulated period. 
These proposals created a storm of controversy, with numerous voices 
challenging the Bill for its broad scope and quite severe curtailment of expressive 
freedoms.122 Of particular concern is the potential range of public policy-oriented 
communications that may qualify as “election advertisements” and thus become 
subject to the Election Finance Bill’s quite extensive regulatory requirements. The 
definition’s breadth may cause it to encompass messages that are not intended to 
influence an election, but rather are directed at legitimate matters of public policy. 
                                               
119 ibid., cl. 53. 
120 ibid., cl. 14. Consequently, any group with any members who are under 18 years of age will be 
prohibited from registering as a third party. 
121 ibid., cls. 22, 42, 44, 47. 
122 The New Zealand Law Society, for example, submitted that the Bill “…is likely to curtail the 
legitimate expression of opinions while failing to curb (and potentially even incentivising) clandestine 
conduct in relation to the electoral process. The bill as a whole represents a backward step in the 
integrity of democracy in New Zealand.” New Zealand Law Society, Submission to the Justice and 
Electoral Committee on the Electoral Finance Bill. The Human Rights Commission also submitted; 
“As currently drafted the Bill will infringe certain human rights - most obviously freedom of 
expression but also the right of all citizens to participate in the election process.” Human Rights 
Commission, Submission of the Human Rights Commission on the Electoral Finance Bill to the Justice 
and Electoral Committee. 
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The public debate that occurred in early 2007 around amending the Crimes Act 1961, 
s.59—the so-called “anti-smacking Bill”—is a case in point. Had this discussion 
taken place during an election year under the rules proposed in the Electoral Finance 
Bill, it would be very difficult to know how much of it would have constituted 
“election advertising”. Furthermore, while the spending caps on such “election 
advertising” may seem high in the abstract, it is not clear whether they really are 
sufficient to allow third parties to engage in “meaningful” communications with the 
electorate. A single page advertisement in the Saturday edition of the Otago Daily 
Times, for example, costs $6000. Given that this publication only reaches some 
100,000 readers, it would cost a registered third party a full 10% of its permitted 
nationwide spending to communicate in this fashion with a mere 2.5% of New 
Zealand’s population. 
As at the time of writing, it seems highly probable that Parliament’s Justice 
and Electoral Committee will recommend that the Electoral Finance Bill be amended 
significantly.123 Whether this advice is followed, or whether any resultant changes 
will be sufficient to allay concerns about the legislation’s effect on freedom of 
expression, remains to be seen. However, there are two further issues raised by this 
legislative proposal that should be noted in the context of this article. First, it was 
introduced into the House of Representatives without any attached notice from the 
Attorney General under the NZBORA, s.7. The Attorney-General’s failure to act 
reflected advice from the Crown Law Office that the various restrictions on 
expression contained in the Electoral Funding Bill could all be demonstrably justified 
as per s.5.124 This analysis can be criticised for failing to fully appreciate the overall 
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impact of the proposed regulations on the expressive rights of those wishing to 
involve themselves in public debate, as well as for being overly deferential to the 
Government’s choices as to how such debate should be regulated. Consequently, 
Parliament was not as fully informed about the Bill’s implications for the right to 
freedom of expression under the NZBORA as it should have been. Second, the 
Electoral Finance Bill tightly limits the fundraising of third parties without really 
altering the rules under which political parties and individual candidates operate. 
These latter electoral contestants will still be permitted to receive unlimited sums of 
money from donors who need not disclose their identity to the public,125 while 
registered third parties must disclose each and every donor who gives more than 
$500. The spectre of MPs placing more severe fundraising rules upon third parties 
than they themselves are required to abide by is troubling, to put it mildly. 
 
(iv): Limiting the coverage of Parliament. 
 
This last point reflects the general concern that arises whenever Parliament imposes 
limits on expression involving a degree of self-dealing. Thus, it may be feared that 
legislative moves to regulate third party electoral expenditures stem from politicians’ 
desire to retain control over the issues debated at election time, rather than being a 
genuine effort to create a “level playing field”. Equally, the Labour-led Government’s 
attempt in 2001 to reintroduce the offence of criminal libel of election candidates, 
complete with a fine of up to $5000 or three months imprisonment, was widely (and 
quite rightly) criticised as a case of politicians protecting their own interests. These 
sorts of concerns also came to the fore in relation to changes to the parliamentary 
rules governing the use of footage of parliamentary proceedings, brought in alongside 
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the introduction of permanent cameras into the Debating Chamber. The House of 
Representatives adopted a Sessional Order containing a new set of controls on 
broadcasting Parliament’s activities that, inter alia, prohibit the use of such footage 
for political advertising or election campaigning (except with the permission of all 
members shown), or for the purpose of satire, ridicule or denigration.126 A breach of 
these rules may not only result in a broadcaster being denied access to coverage of 
Parliament (as actually happened to TV3 in 2006127), but may also be treated as a 
contempt of Parliament.128  
The new rules attracted immediate and widespread criticism from a media 
concerned that a ban on “satire, ridicule or denigration” would overly inhibit their 
activities when covering and commenting on what takes place in the House.129 
However, Peter Dunne, leader of the United Future Party, defended the measure on 
the grounds that: 
Parliament is the highest court in the land. It is entirely proper that there 
are some boundaries around how its presentation occurs. The media will 
always continue to satirise and to lampoon—that is a legitimate and strong 
historical tradition. But it is not a principle of democracy to start from the 
presumption that the first thing to be preserved is the right to satirise and 
to lampoon. That is a consequence; it is not a substantive principal 
argument.130 
 
On this analysis, the media stand accused of being more concerned with retaining 
their ability to use footage in edited or out-of-context ways to make MPs appear 
foolish or mendacious, rather than fully presenting to the public the reality of 
parliamentary practice. Consequently, the dispute reflects a basic disagreement 
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between why MPs believe parliamentary proceeding should be broadcast—to “make 
parliamentary debate more accessible to the public and to improve public 
understanding of the democratic process”131—and why the media seem to believe it 
should be broadcast—to provide them with footage that they may then use in 
whatever way they deem most suitable (even if only to boost their ratings).  
 That said, while there is reason to be somewhat suspicious of the media’s 
motives in contesting these rules, it noteworthy that MPs did not give any 
consideration when crafting them as to whether they were NZBORA consistent. 
Although the House is bound by this legislation by virtue of s.3(a), the report of the 
Standing Orders Committee makes no mention at all of the right to freedom of 
expression affirmed in s.14; much less does it inquire into whether the rules constitute 
a “demonstrably justified” limit on this right.132 Instead, the Committee seems to 
assume that because other legislative bodies have similar rules in place—the 
Parliaments of New South Wales and Victoria are specifically mentioned133—it must 
be acceptable for New Zealand to adopt them as well. It need hardly be pointed out 
that this is a less than satisfactory form of scrutiny of the relevant freedom of 
expression issues. 
Nevertheless, the NZBORA consistency of these new rules actually may not 
matter in the long run. The country’s television broadcasters—TVNZ, TV3, Maori 
TV and Sky News—have issued a joint statement that they will ignore the rules 
“where warranted”, and that if one broadcaster is ejected from covering Parliament 
for breaching the rules, all will cease covering it.134 This act of defiance has caused 
the Act, National and Green Parties to revisit their earlier support for the rules, while 
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Prime Minister Helen Clark has also called for “further dialogue” on the issue.135 In 
short, the legal niceties surrounding this issue seem to play second fiddle to the 
public’s perception of it (“bloody MPs can’t take a joke”136) and the power of the 
broadcast media to shape that perception. And given that MPs need the news media 
just as much as the news media needs MPs, there perhaps is little need for a 
guaranteed right of freedom of expression to protect their interests against 




This article commenced with two claims. First, that New Zealand displayed a general 
(albeit less than total) cultural commitment to freedom of expression prior to the 
legislative affirmation of that right through the NZBORA, s.14. Second, that the way 
that this general cultural commitment cashes out in practice — the manner in which it 
has been balanced against competing social goods in particular circumstances — can 
be expected to vary over time in response to changing social and cultural 
circumstances. Therefore, I would argue, the introduction of the NZBORA did not 
represent any particular legal watershed in terms of recognising the importance of 
freedom of expression in New Zealand. And New Zealand’s approach to evolving 
freedom of expression issues since this legislation’s passage has continued to reflect 
the contested and contingent nature of the right. In the field of private law, the courts 
broadened the defence of qualified privilege in response to concerns about the 
potential “chill effect” that defamation law may have on criticism of public political 
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figures. Yet similar concerns about the potential effect on expressive values of a tort 
of invasion of privacy did not stop the judiciary from creating this new private law 
action. Likewise, the continued existence of a censorship regime reflects an ongoing 
societal view that some forms of expression are inherently so disagreeable or 
undesirable that they should be prohibited altogether. However, the courts have been 
prepared — some would argue overly-so —  to circumscribe this regulatory regime in 
the name of protecting the individual right to create, possess and distribute material 
that is distasteful to others. Even in the core area of political expression the regulatory 
picture is decidedly mixed. Motivated by a desire to safeguard dissent against 
established social practices, Parliament is in the midst of repealing the various 
“sedition offences”. A bare majority on the Supreme Court similarly were convinced 
in Brooker v Police of the need to limit the bounds of “disorderly behaviour” so as to 
preserve the rights of protest. At the same time, however, Parliament currently is 
considering whether to impose significant restraints on third party participation at 
election time through the Electoral Funding Bill, while it also has moved to restrict 
the broadcasters’ use of televised coverage of activities in the debating chamber. 
Consequently, it is difficult to discern any particularly coherent or consistent 
approach to expressive issues in New Zealand law. Perhaps all that can be concluded 
about the current state of freedom of expression under New Zealand law is that it is 
broadly recognised and respected as a valuable and important social good — until 
such time as another more valuable or important social good requires that it be 
restricted. 
